Abstract
I consider political agency models with endogenous entry of candidates. Two equilibria may arise, one in which only good individuals go into politics and another in which both bad and good individuals do so. These equilibria are self-fulfilling prophecies: voter cynicism raises the survival probabilities of bad politicians and thus induces bad citizens to start a career in politics. If the proportion of good individuals in the society is sufficiently high, the model will show only the good equilibrium. I analyze the impact of popularity shocks on the set of equilibria.
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More From: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
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