Abstract
Existing research on the extensive Chinese censorship organization uses observational methods with well-known limitations. We conducted the first large-scale experimental study of censorship by creating accounts on numerous social media sites, randomly submitting different texts, and observing from a worldwide network of computers which texts were censored and which were not. We also supplemented interviews with confidential sources by creating our own social media site, contracting with Chinese firms to install the same censoring technologies as existing sites, and--with their software, documentation, and even customer support--reverse-engineering how it all works. Our results offer rigorous support for the recent hypothesis that criticisms of the state, its leaders, and their policies are published, whereas posts about real-world events with collective action potential are censored.
Highlights
The Chinese government has implemented “the most elaborate system for internet content control in the world” [1], marshaling hundreds of thousands of people to strategically slow the flow of certain types of information among the Chinese people
The largest previous study of the purpose of Chinese censorship distinguished between the “state critique” and “collective action potential” theories of censorship and found that, with few exceptions, the first was wrong and the second was right: unlike most prior claims, even vitriolic criticisms of the government in social media are not censored but any attempt to physically move people in ways not sanctioned by the government are
Based on interviews with those involved in the process, we find a great deal of uncertainty over the exact censorship requirements and the precise rules for which the government would interfere with the operation of social media sites, especially for smaller sites with limited government connections
Summary
The Chinese government has implemented “the most elaborate system for internet content control in the world” [1], marshaling hundreds of thousands of people to strategically slow the flow of certain types of information among the Chinese people. The sheer size and influence of this organization has made it possible for researchers to infer via passive observation a great deal about its purpose and procedures, as well as the intentions of the Chinese government. The largest previous study of the purpose of Chinese censorship distinguished between the “state critique” and “collective action potential” theories of censorship and found that, with few exceptions, the first was wrong and the second was right: unlike most prior claims, even vitriolic criticisms of the government in social media are not censored but any attempt to physically move people in ways not sanctioned by the government are. Even posts that praise the government are censored if they pertain to real world collective action events [2]
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