Political Representation in Liquid Democracy

Chiara Valsangiacomo

doi:10.3389/fpos.2021.591853

Abstract

This article provides an in-depth survey of political representation in Liquid Democracy (LD). More precisely, it refutes two potential criticisms: 1) LD impoverishes the concept of political representation relative to existing representative democracies; 2) LD undermines the centrality of political parties. In answer to (1), the article shows that LD is compatible with a selection model of representation, in which proxies are characterized as gyroscopic representatives, driven by intrinsic motivation and indifferent to sanctions. This claim has far-reaching normative implications for the mandate-independence tradeoff, anti-elitism, and deliberation under LD. With regard to (2), the article examines the function of parties, arguing that, although it puts parties and interest groups on a level playing field, LD does not threaten partisanship, but rather expands the range of potential carriers of partisanship. In addressing these objections, this article demonstrates the democratic credentials of LD, showing that LD is compatible with a high-quality, democratic understanding of representation, which is surrounded by a cluster of thick concepts like commitment, intrinsic motivation, alignment of objectives, sympathy, trust, and dialogue. This turns LD into a powerful instrument for the refurbishment of representation both as a unique mode of political participation and as a practice of self-government.

Highlights

Liquid Democracy (LD) is a timely, alternative model of collective decision-making that challenges traditional models of electoral representation
This article started by asking whether LD dilutes the concept of political representation, by understanding it in purely Pitkinean formalistic and descriptive terms
The article disentangled the substantive view of representation in the proxy-voter relationship, arguing that LD is compatible with a selection model of representation, in which proxies are characterized as gyroscopic representatives

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Liquid Democracy (LD) is a timely, alternative model of collective decision-making that challenges traditional models of electoral representation. The first criticism is that LD impoverishes the concept of political representation in contrast to the virtues associated with representative democracy To address this objection, more needs to be said about the nature of the proxy-voter relationship, the danger that LD might be reduced to a form of minimalist electoral democracy, in which representation is little more than a transaction scheme of delegations. Mansbridge holds that districts should be as homogeneous as possible (Mansbridge, 2009, 380) This requirement is not needed in LD, which makes use of proportional representation and in which constituencies transcend territorial borders: Any original voter can select any proxy from anywhere in the country, an arrangement that is expected to maximize the alignment of objectives, despite the diversity of opinions.. It is true that the original voters can de-select the proxies via instant recall, but why would they rationally want to enter a vicious loop of making rushed decisions, regretting their badly informed decisions, going through a costly monitoring process, sanctioning the proxy, and repeating everything all over again? On the assumption that no one wants to be systematically misrepresented, the original voters are prompted to invest, ex ante, in looking for a reliable proxy, because the costs of repeatedly monitoring, ex post, the entire metadelegation chain would be too high

A Selection Core With a Sanction Periphery

A Challenge for Party Structure and Its Functions

CONCLUSION