Political Regime Dynamics and Social Security Reform: A Case Study of the Social Security Act Amendments during the Periods of Yingluck and Prayuth

Wichuda Satidporn

doi:10.5539/ass.v12n10p244

Abstract

According to previous studies on social security policy in Thailand, a causal link between elected governments and developments in social security has been observed in the direction that the initiation and implementation of social security policy (and perhaps all other social welfare policies) occurred more frequently and more successfully when this country was ruled by an elected government. However, this observation appears problematic when brought to bear on the most recent cases of social security reforms that have occurred, especially during the period under Yingluck Shinawatra government when the attempt to amend the 1990 Social Security Act proposed by the organized labor and 14,264 public petitioners was rejected by the directly-elected House of Representatives; and the period under Prayuth Chan-ocha government when the Social Security Act Amendments of 2015, which included many requests from organized labor mentioned in the rejected bill, was passed by the appointed National Legislative Assembly. Relying on a strategic-relational approach, this paper claims that the changes and continuities in the social security policy in each particular period did not occurred as simply a result of the different types of political regime but was part of a broader effort to deal with the tensions and conflicts between and within different sections of the bourgeoisie, political parties, state agencies, and working class over policy problems, solutions, and directions that have emerged as a result of Thailand’s capitalist transition during the past decade.

Highlights

Previous studies on social security policy in Thailand have consistently demonstrated that the initiation and implementation of social security policy occurred more frequently and more successfully when the country was ruled by an elected government (Nipon, 2003; Somkiat & Khoop, 2010; Vause & Chandravithun, 1992)
Relying on the so-called strategic-relational approach (Note 1), this paper argues that in order to explain the changes and continuities in the social security policy in the periods of, for instance, the Yingluck and Prayuth governments; we must rather focus on the state and consider the state system in at least two aspects
Regarding the process of the selection of representatives of employers and employees, where 5 representatives of employers are selected by 11 employer councils and 5 representatives of employees are selected by 9 employee councils, major criticisms have focused on methods that do not reflect the real representation of employers and employees

Summary

Introduction

Previous studies on social security policy in Thailand have consistently demonstrated that the initiation and implementation of social security policy (and perhaps all other social welfare policies) occurred more frequently and more successfully when the country was ruled by an elected government (Nipon, 2003; Somkiat & Khoop, 2010; Vause & Chandravithun, 1992). 2-3), for example, indicated that many major social welfare policies were begun initiated in Thailand during the periods when the government was elected. There have been very few cases in which social welfare policies were introduced by a nonelected government; for instance, the 1972 Workmen’s Compensation Fund promulgated during the period of Thanom Kittikachorn (December 9, 1963 – October 14, 1973) and the Act to Protect Car Victims initiated during the period of Anand Panyarachun (March 2, 1991 – March 23, 1992). The interruption of social welfare policy initiation and implementation was observed during the periods of nonelected governments. The causal link that previous writers draw between elected governments and developments in social security appear problematic ass.ccsenet.org

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Conclusion