Abstract
We study the link between lobbying and industrial concentration. Using data for the past 20 years in the US, we show how lobbying increases when an industry becomes more concentrated, using mergers as shocks to concentration. This holds true both for expenditures on federal lobbying as well as expenditures on campaign contributions. Results are in line with the predictions of a model where lobbying is akin to a public good for incumbents, and thus typically underprovided, while a merger solves the coordination problem.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
