Abstract

This essay traces the development of the power of the Italian Constitutional Court, the political impact of its policies, and its reception by the public and the other institutions of government. The relationship between the Court and Parliament is presented as one characterized by a synchronization of powers, and the Court has demonstrated reluctance to interfere in conflicts among the various branches of the national government. That timidity has not, however, carried over into its treatment of referenda or of national versus regional prerogatives. The Constitutional Court is, according to this analysis, a part of the national governing elite, and its most controversial decisions have been ones safeguarding the interests of that elite. By carefully acting as “quasi-guardians,” the Constitutional Court judges have cemented a solidly positive reputation and nurtured an aura of legitimacy that is rare among Italian political actors.

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