Abstract
Political machines are widely evident in Indonesian elections, particularly in the sale of political services and use of clientelistic strategies. However, in several cases candidates have created political machines without buying political services or employing clientelistic strategies. Using a qualitative approach to examine the 2018 village chief election in Ngestiharjo, Yogyakarta, this article explains how electoral challengers can use political machines without buying political services, as well as the reason such challengers and their machines decide not to employ clientelism in their search for electoral victory. The author shows that several factors, including elite fragmentation, candidate recruitment, socio-political networks, and the existence of a shared enemy effectively nullify the buying of political services and the use of clientelistic strategies. This article shows that local village contexts, as well as reliance on social bonds, enable challengers to avoid the transactionalism and clientelism that have long characterised political machines. This is further supported by the ability of a challenger and his socio-political network to exploit the weaknesses of the incumbent.
Highlights
At the village level, electoral democracy has been practiced in Indonesia for centuries, from when supporters clashed (Lombard, 1996) or fought with sticks (Kartodirdjo, 1992) to show their support for a favoured village candidate
This study explores such political machines, defined as political organisations and groups that mobilise support by providing material goods and services in exchange for votes, as they were used in the 2018 village chief elections
This study finds that the challenger did not purchase political services, but rather was approached by the owner of the political machine and asked to contest the election; it was this individual who covered the majority of the campaign costs
Summary
Electoral democracy has been practiced in Indonesia for centuries, from when supporters clashed (Lombard, 1996) or fought with sticks (Kartodirdjo, 1992) to show their support for a favoured village candidate. The Chairman of PDIP’s Ngestiharjo Branch knew that Purwono had been a dedicated party member since the 1990s, and used the party’s networks to consolidate support for the candidate Over his ten years as village chief (2002–2012), Purwono continued to consult with PDIP about government programmes, using the local branch as a think tank in his planning activities (HP, interview, October 9, 2018).. Over the course of the campaign, several village administrators—including the chairman of the elections commission—supported Oni, as seen by their willingness to extend the registration period and by their campaigning for the incumbent in several parts of the village (SL, interview, November 1, 2018).32 Considering this detrimental to his own campaign, Fathoni asked the former members of Surojo’s campaign team to arrange a meeting with Suharsono, the Regent of Bantul. Several of these campaign messages went viral among the local community, being shared and discussed for days afterwards
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