Political leadership for peace processes: Juan Manuel Santos – Between hawk and dove

Juliana Tappe Ortiz

doi:10.1177/1742715020951229

Abstract

Many studies have explored Colombia’s peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – guerrilla group (2012–2016). Conflict negotiation literature indicates that the impact of leadership is particularly relevant to peace processes as leaders have to find a balance between war and peace. Still, little is known about the political leaders in charge. This study deals with the development of a political leader’s leadership in peace initiatives. It uses an in-depth case study of Colombia’s former President Juan Manuel Santos combining leadership and conflict negotiation literature to trace back the origins of his leadership. Santos, a controversial figure, represented a policy of reconciliation to negotiate with the opponents while also appearing tough in order to maintain his political base. Between hawk and dove, he initiated and signed the peace negotiation and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2016. I adopt a personal biography approach using biographical data to explore the origins of Santos’ beliefs and values, his competence and skills and the way others perceived him. Linking this leadership-centred argument with findings from the conflict negotiation suggests that a pragmatic and reconciliation-oriented leadership might be relevant to find solutions to protracted conflicts like the one in Colombia. Most importantly, it contributes to a significant claim: Leaders have at least some level of choice and their biographical factors are relevant for political outcomes.

Highlights

Much has been written about why leaders go to war (Fearon, 1995; Horowitz et al, 2015), but there is still a need to fully understand why they initiate peace processes
Conflict negotiation literature indicates that in order to be capable of initiating a peace process, the political leaders in charge have to represent a policy of recognition, and even reconciliation, to negotiate with the opponents; on the other side, they have to appear tough to maintain their political base who often struggles to accept that the government makes political concessions (Gormley-Heenan, 2001; Stedman, 1997; Zartman, 2001)
The analysis provides a better understanding of the extent to which political leaders may be able to improve the likeliness that peaceful solutions to armed conflicts are initiated

Summary

Introduction

Much has been written about why leaders go to war (Fearon, 1995; Horowitz et al, 2015), but there is still a need to fully understand why they initiate peace processes. This is especially relevant for seemingly intractable conflicts like that of Colombia, a country that has been entangled in a bitter struggle between the government and different guerrilla movements for over half a century (Deas, 2015). Political leaders often hesitate to initiate a peace process perceiving them as cost intensive, ambiguous and risky (Ramsbotham et al, 2011: 159–163; Westlake, 2000) This has not been the Colombian experience, as all Colombian presidents since 1978 have sought peace with the guerrillas – and failed. I prefer the term ‘pragmatic’, understood as the capacity to maintain followers through appearing strong and making decisions which increase political power

Methods

Conclusion