Abstract

This paper characterizes the evolution of Paraguay s policymaking process (PMP) between 1954 and 2003. We present an overview of the PMP under the rule of Alfredo Stroessner (1954-89) and explore the institutional setting emerging after 1989. We discuss how the Colorado Party progressively broke up into several factions and characterize the distinctive patterns of policymaking that emerged after the adoption of the 1992 Constitution. We hypothesize that the presence of a large number of veto players has made policy change more difficult and that legislators are inclined to pursue particularistic policies. In order to test those hypotheses, we rely on a database containing virtually every bill introduced in Congress since April 1992. Our conclusions suggest that the current Paraguayan PMP may be flexible for the provision of particularistic benefits but is rigid for the approval of broad regulatory or redistributive policies.

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