Abstract
This chapter describes how different constitutional arrangements affect military effectiveness by exploring the United States and the United Kingdom. It argues that the difference in institutional structures in these countries has led in military organizations that capitalize on different elements of military effectiveness. The strength of military organizations impacts the degree to which those military organizations can develop and communicate their preferences. Data reveals that civilians force change on the military when they come to agreement on issues of military importance, but the choices that make most political sense to civilians sometimes decrease military responsiveness. British domestic political institutions promote agreement and look to weaken military professional autonomy. This can result to integration and responsiveness, but can hamper the growth of skill (and spending) compared to the United States.
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