Abstract
Tariffs and quotas are not symmetric under a variety of circumstances. This paper pursues the implications of one such circumstance — domestic market power — for the political choice of protectionist instrument in the context of a political support maximization model. Tariffs dominate quotas in the political model in the absence of revenue seeking motives. In the presence of revenue seeking, ambiguity arises but limits can be placed on the range of tariff or quota levels. Also, some welfare implications emerge.
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