Abstract
Drawing on institutional theory and resource dependent theory, this study proposed that political endorsement of a firm, playing as political genes, restrains it from pursuing the low-quality innovation. Using data on 2406 Chinese listed companies spanning from 2008 to 2016, we find that the political endorsement significantly inhibits low-quality innovation. That inhibition is stronger among firms with more slack resources and weaker in provinces with greater market liberalization. Our findings provide contributions on the low-quality innovation from political perspective, and benefit for the innovation implications.
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