Political Environments, Elite Co-Option, and Conflict

Abstract

This article establishes a framework for understanding the ways in which subnational governance arrangements produce divergent types and dynamics of political violence. The variation in agents of governance, how a regime shapes its territorial presence and subnational relationships, structures the forms of violent conflict that emerge within and across states. We first acknowledge four distinct types of political environments based on regime depth and subnational elite authority and fragmentation. We then apply these political environment categorizations and logics to the political violence patterns, agents, and risks across key states in Africa. We find that violence across countries varies based on distinct power dynamics that emerge from relations between the central authority and subnational elites. We conclude that the organization of power determines the type and risk of conflict that affects states. Although the interaction among local governance, co-optive arrangements, and violence has been largely neglected in the literature, this article proposes an alternative and generalizable interpretation of governance across developing states, based on subnational patterns of authority. This article contributes to a growing focus on political settlements—rather than national institutions—in explaining governance stability and violence. Key Words: Africa, conflict, domestic politics, political geography.