Political elections and corporate investment: International evidence

Abstract

A recent literature shows that the spike in uncertainty during political elections harms firms’ investment. Bridging insights from international business and political science, we argue that the effect of political elections on firms’ investment activities is contingent on the country’s electoral system. In particular, we expect the negative effect of elections on corporate investment to be smaller for firms operating in plurality systems. We test our theory using a panel dataset of listed firms around the world, and a panel of US multinationals. Our results confirm that during an election period firms in countries with a plurality system reduce investment less than firms in other countries. Additionally, we show that multinationals’ foreign investment is affected by elections abroad: their investment in a host country declines during an election in that country, though to a lesser extent if the election is held with a plurality system. Collectively, our findings provide new evidence on the role of political institutions for firms’ investment decisions.