Political Economy of Reforms

Abstract

On the 12th of June 1991, Boris Yeltsin became the president of Russia, as a result of the country’S first presidential elections. Two months later, in response to the communist putsch of August 1991, Yeltsin — risking snipers’ fire — climbed a tank addressing the crowd at the front of Russian Parliament, The putsch failed. That was 19th of August 1991, probably the high point of the democratic revolution in Russia. Yet, only two years later, it was Yeltsin who sent tanks against the same parliament building. The parliament, which opposed Yeltsin, triggering constitutional crisis, was elected in quasi-democratic elections, so its legitimacy could be contested. However, It is not the nature of elections that define democracy. It is the willingness of all key players to reach consensus Instead of using force against each other. Yeltsin consolidated power, which could arguably be used to complete the reforms — the reforms which proved partial, Inconsequential, chaotic and producing little results over the previous year. Did suppressing democracy help the economic reform process? Or was 4th of October 1993 another turning point In Russian history, from which neither political nor economic liberalization fully recovered until today?KeywordsEuropeIncomeDefendBorisOmicThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.