Abstract
We contribute to the literature on the political determinants of regional financing by analyzing the case of Spain, a largely decentralized country. Using a dynamic panel data model, we argue that the rise in relative bargaining power of regional parties in Spain can partly explain the increase in budgetary allocations to regions observed during the period 1986–2006. In particular, our results show that the rise in parliamentary representation of the nationalist Catalonian party, measured by the Banzhaf voting power index, has been a significant factor in ensuring increasing financial resources to regional governments. In addition, the traditional hypotheses of the political economy literature on legislative apportionment are tested for the case of Spain, with no significant results observed. The overall distribution of regional financing in Spain seems to be in general well aligned with the basic economic principles of efficiency and equity recommended for such a system.
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