Abstract
This article explores the effect of political and institutional constraints on negotiations that seek to end civil wars. Two aspects of negotiations are statistically examined. Greater political constraints on the leaders of states appear to have no effect on the likelihood of negotiations taking place, but greater political constraints do reduce the likelihood of negotiations succeeding. The results of this analysis demonstrate that political constraints are a powerful factor driving the likelihood of negotiation success. The article concludes with a discussion of why political constraints do not produce a similar reduction in the likelihood of negotiations.
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