Political connections and family business diversification

Abstract

Personal political connections with politicians have positive contribution to the abnormal returns of firms (Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Bierman, 1999; Chung, 2006; Dinc, 2005; Faccio, 2006; Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005; Imai, 2006). Business owners and executives have incentives to invest in political connections because such relationship may enable their firms to gain access to key information not available to the competitors. However, the impact of political connections on the behaviors of firms has only received scant interest in the literature (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009). The objective of this research is to examine the impact of formal and informal political connections on the scope of family business diversification. We focus on family business because of their unique access to family ties or family social capital to achieve business objectives (Sharma, 2004; Steier, 2003). We test our hypotheses using panel data from 35 Taiwan-based family business groups from 1988 to 2002. Our analysis shows that the informal political connections possessed by the parent generation owners of family business groups are better predictors of family business diversification than the informal political connections established by the children generations owners. This result complements the resource dependence theory by suggesting that durable and non-transferable political connections possessed by family leaders have a unique effect in the corporate decision to diversify. Additionally, the personal ties between politicians and parent generation family leaders are “sticky.” They cannot be easily succeeded by the younger generations.