Abstract
AbstractUsing disaggregated data on Indian state‐owned banks, we study how political connections influence their lending behaviour. The findings indicate an overall credit expansion of 10% during election years for banks with political connections, driven by increased lending to agriculture and Small and Medium Enterprises. Further disaggregation reveals cycles in such lending driven by electoral considerations, primarily for banks with political connections. In turn, there is a gradual weakening in the asset quality of these banks. The net effect is manifest in lower productivity. The key policy implication is that electoral manipulation exerts significant economic costs.
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