Political competition in judge and prosecutor elections

Abstract

The United States is unique in that important actors within the criminal justice system, namely judges and prosecutors, are selected in popular election. Several states are currently adjusting whether political party affiliation is listed on the ballot. Additionally, states differ by how easy it is for candidates from non-dominant parties to gain access to the ballot. We use a laboratory experiment to investigate how these two important policy changes to political competition affect campaign spending and outcomes. Using asymmetric contests designed to capture the institutional change, we find that subjects spend beyond both the socially optimal level and the amount predicted by theory. This over-competition is not uniform, but rather concentrated in those subjects who have the strategic advantage (either dominant-party affiliation or restricted ballot access of competitors). Opening up the election process, therefore, leads to reductions in the wasteful, rent-seeking spending (contrary to theory). Disadvantaged subjects are less likely to exit the race when the election process is opened, as well. Thus, a level playing field promotes participation. Furthermore, we explore heterogeneous treatment effects, finding less campaign spending for risk-loving, non-ambiguity averse, strategically sophisticated, and pro-social subjects. Therefore, elections disproportionately select individuals without these characteristics. Additionally, the mix of those who win the election adjust with changes in the electoral rules as well.