Political Clientelism in the Philippine

Abstract

This is a study of Philippine presidential appointments to explain in the framework of political clientelism, where appointments to the offices is one of major political resources for the President in the exchanges of support. The examples are intensively drawn from unofficial documents Ramon Magsaysay Presidential Papers and Carlos P. Garcia Presidential Papers, in the days of 1950's, but the offices of middle and lower rank, rather than highest officers like cabinet member rank, are focused.The purposes are dual. One is the general description of constitutional, legal and institutional aspects, which provide the basic arena for the generation of presidential clientelism, and the other, general argument of traditional political model where Philippine social culture is largely responsible for its basic operational norm.In Chapter I, it is argued that highly centralized institutions, such as centerlocal relations, the prerogative of Presidential appointing power, wide range of coverage and the numbers of appointees, as well as political effects of electoral system and of the Commission on Appointment in reality assigned intervention and intercession as key concept in the fighting of Filipino's appointive process.In Chapter II, the authority and role of the Philippine president in traditional society is briefly explored. The expectations of highly personalized, de facto authority but full of legal authority are derived from the role model of traditional patron and political broker in the modern state system. Therefore, appointees, by nature, are allowed submissive sharing of power and influence of president's personal authority from which he draws his own power.Chapter III illustrates politics of Philippine presidential appointments as patronage process and political instrumental through varieties of examples listed below.Centralized nature of control over local offices are briefly reviewed and exemplified by Magsaysay's military officer as chief of police of its administative and political effect, and by Garcia's Cebu Vice-Mayor, made out of purely political consideration through the Osmeña, Sr. men.Beyond qualification, personal loyalty, and contribution, considerations of cultural factor, political utility and constraints weigh in President's making choice. The trustworthy are those who have private ties and direct access, such as patron-client relations, family associations, compadres, professional associates, political party mates, province and town fellows, often being overlapped, but of different professions. By appointing one, the president gains more supports from those who are connected to the appointee. In seeking bureaucratic position, the competitive “palakasan” game of political backing or influence on the part of appointees is inevitable along with logics of exchanges and norms of reciprocity.An established practice of privilege in recommending successors from the same locality to the unfinished term of higher office is exemplified, to symbolize and to represent pragmatic interests of local and linguistic group; an influential Senator who failed to be reelected, claimed for one higher office as reward and compensation, thus, the logic of party loyalty and sentiments of self-sacrifice prevailed; an UN ambassador appeal to Vice-President Garcia for extension of term of office of an military attaché under him justified his protective measure not only because the man is his compadre and political “lider” but also complexed networks of compadreship obligated him; an example of Garcia's favor for promotion of Mrs. Magsaysay's brother, immediately after he succeeded presidency, illustrates his action as patron and political broker. Even strict Magsaysay pays a little favor to Garcia's brother and to his compadre. Some other cases showed constraints imposed upon the influences and desire of President a