Abstract
This article tests hypotheses of the clientelist theory of political participation using both individual level cross sectional survey data and aggregate level data from all 76 provinces in Thailand for the 1996, 2001 and the 2005 General Election timeframes. According to the clientelist theory of political participation, we would expect higher participation among those with fewer resources when there is an incentive for a patron to buy participation, and lower participation where there is no incentive. I use linear and logistical regression to test hypotheses derived from this theory and find there is support enough to suggest clientelism as a cause of political participation during the democratic period of Thailand. The results have important implications for understanding clientelism, regime legitimacy and the prospects for a return to democracy.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
