Abstract

The political business cycle (PBC) refers to the phenomenon of an incumbent utilizing fiscal or monetary policies to create an economic boom before an election so that periodic fluctuations are induced according to election calendars. This article uses panel data from 1992 to 2010 to examine the effect of presidential elections on central government departmental expenditure in Taiwan. The results suggest an opportunistic PBC in Taiwan after the first Taiwanese presidential direct election in 1996. Furthermore, Taiwan’s government expenditure cycles have been significantly stronger in the years of the “new democracy.”

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.