Political and constitutional overrides: the case of the Court of Justice of European Union

Abstract

ABSTRACT Overrides are acts by politicians which undo or modify the impact of court decisions. In the field of judicial politics in general, and in studies of the Court of Justice of the European Union’s role in European integration in particular, the existence and effects of overrides have been intensely debated. This article argues that much of this disagreement is driven by a lack of a common definition of the term at issue. It distinguishes between ‘political’ and ‘constitutional’ overrides, and defines the conditions under which either matters for judicial independence in the European Union and the Court's impact on European integration. This is followed by an investigation into the occurrence of overrides in the European Union. It is concluded that while political overrides, where the policy impact of court decisions are affected by subsequent EU legislation, have occurred, constitutional overrides, which challenge or revise the Court’s mandate, have not.