Political Altruism of Transboundary Water Sharing

Anik Bhaduri,Edward B Barbier

doi:10.2202/1935-1682.1699

Abstract

Abstract In the paper, using a political altruism model, we make an attempt to explain why an upstream country might agree to a treaty that recognizes and enforces the water claims of a downstream country. In a natural extension of the standard economic model, it is possible to explain the above phenomena, by allowing for altruism between countries. The altruistic concerns of the countries are dependent on other country's willingness to have a good political relationship. If both the countries maintain favorable political relations with one another, then the upstream country will care about the impacts of its water diversion on the downstream country's welfare. The paper also illustrates the case of water sharing of the Ganges River between India and Bangladesh. The Ganges River, like many other rivers in the world, ignores political boundaries. In Bangladesh, the final downstream country along the Ganges, freshwater availability depends on the share of water diverted by the upstream country, India. For decades, India and Bangladesh failed to resolve the water-sharing issues of the Ganges River. However, in 1996, both India and Bangladesh signed a major new agreement on water sharing (Ganges River Treaty) in an effort to resolve the dispute. Using the political altruism model developed in the paper, we examine why despite needing more water than is available under the treaty, India has adapted to shortages instead of resorting to conflict with Bangladesh.

Highlights

With a growing population and rapidly expanding water demand for development, especially for irrigated agriculture, an upstream country would clearly benefit from continuing to divert more water in transboundary water sharing of a river
In agreeing to a treaty, why do the upstream countries not obtain compensation from downstream countries in exchange for lowering upstream diversion levels? The paper proposes that the efficient allocation of water sharing between an upstream and a downstream country may be the result of an alternative motivation: limited pure altruism between countries
Current economic and planning literature assumes that such water conflicts can be resolved by analyzing the river basin as a single unit

Summary

Introduction

With a growing population and rapidly expanding water demand for development, especially for irrigated agriculture, an upstream country would clearly benefit from continuing to divert more water in transboundary water sharing of a river. We know that many upstream countries and many individuals in upstream countries do care about the welfare of downstream countries. This is evident as countries sign far-reaching international agreements on water sharing that seem to be against their own narrowly defined economic self-interests (Wolf et al 2003). The issue to be addressed by this paper is the question of why upstream countries agree to forego unilateral water diversion in order to cooperate with downstream countries on water sharing. The paper proposes that the efficient allocation of water sharing between an upstream and a downstream country may be the result of an alternative motivation: limited pure (non paternalistic) altruism between countries In agreeing to a treaty, why do the upstream countries not obtain compensation from downstream countries in exchange for lowering upstream diversion levels? The paper proposes that the efficient allocation of water sharing between an upstream and a downstream country may be the result of an alternative motivation: limited pure (non paternalistic) altruism between countries

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Conclusion