Abstract

Institutional designers, international organizations and post-Soviet political actors have directed considerable attention to the design and conduct of elections in postcommunist states. This article explores the nature of electoral system re-design by investigating the motives and interactions of legislators, parties and presidents. Following the veto players literature, the analysis focuses on the determinants of policy stability and change. The process of institutional re-design is evaluated in two cases: the successful introduction of the Law on Political Parties in Russia and unsuccessful attempts at major election reform in Ukraine. The article shows that the outcomes of policy reform processes in these 'superpresidential' systems were not solely determined by presidential preferences. Rather, to fully understand election system re-design, it is critical to evaluate the preferences of all relevant veto players.

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