Political accountability and governance in rural areas: Some evidence from the Pilot Programme LEADER+ in Poland

Abstract

The ‘LEADER community initiatives’ and the ‘LEADER approach’ have been commonly accepted as an innovative way for development of rural areas in the European Union. While many factors influencing the adoption of this approach have been identified, relatively little is known about the role of institutional factors that are thought to affect political accountability. In this paper we argue that the way local officials are held accountable for their actions may importantly affect the modes of governance in rural areas. Our focus is on electoral rules and the size of electoral districts. Using data from the early stage of LEADER implementation in Poland and a probit analysis, we show some evidence that the programme was adopted in municipalities with majoritarian elections and electoral districts of smaller size. This is consistent with political economy literature arguing that policy innovations are more likely to occur in an environment where holding politicians to account is easier. This suggests that efforts to encourage ‘bottom-up’ rural development projects cannot ignore incentives of the local officials who may oppose initiatives that can threaten their rents to holding political office.