Abstract

There is a large body of literature devoted to how “policies create politics” and how feedback effects from existing policy legacies shape potential reforms in a particular area. Although much of this literature focuses on self‐reinforcing feedback effects that increase support for existing policies over time, Kent Weaver and his colleagues have recently drawn our attention to self‐undermining effects that can gradually weaken support for such policies. The following contribution explores both self‐reinforcing and self‐undermining policy feedback in relationship to the Affordable Care Act, the most important health‐care reform enacted in the United States since the mid‐1960s. More specifically, the paper draws on the concept of policy feedback to reflect on the political fate of the ACA since its adoption in 2010. We argue that, due in part to its sheer complexity and fragmentation, the ACA generates both self‐reinforcing and self‐undermining feedback effects that, depending of the aspect of the legislation at hand, can either facilitate or impede conservative retrenchment and restructuring. Simultaneously, through a discussion of partisan effects that shape Republican behavior in Congress, we acknowledge the limits of policy feedback in the explanation of policy stability and change.

Highlights

  • Much has been written about how “policies create politics” and how feedback effects from existing policy legacies shape the likelihood and character of future reforms

  • Some scholars argue that feedback effects from existing policies are not always self‐reinforcing (Patashnik & Zelizer, 2013; Soss & Schram, 2007) and that they can even undermine specific government programs over time (Jacobs & Weaver, 2015; Oberlander & Weaver, 2015; Weaver, 2010)

  • Complicating the picture further, just when the political window seemed to open for the Affordable Care Act (ACA)’s opponents to repeal the law, it became apparent that the 2010 law had generated self‐reinforcing mechanisms limiting the capacity of Republicans in Congress and the White House to dismantle or at least profoundly reshape it. This leaves the question of whether to view the evolution of the ACA through the lens of self‐ reinforcing feedback, self‐undermining feedback, or a combination of both, while taking into account how these feedback effects interact with partisan effects and the policy preferences of Republicans pursuing conservative‐directed policy change in the aftermath of the 2016 elections

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Summary

University of Leicester

Political Science Faculty Research and Publications/College of Arts and Sciences. This paper is NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; but the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be accessed by following the link in th citation below. Policy Studies Journal, Vol 47, No 2 (May 2019): 395-422. This article is © Wiley and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley

Introduction
The ACA and Policy Feedback
No state waiver
Not repealed
Changes Converted to Converted to
Proportional reduction in error
Findings
Discussion
Full Text
Published version (Free)

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