Abstract
AbstractDoes public policy in the United Kingdom respond to changes in public preferences? If so, is this the result of the government changing its policy to reflect preferences (“policy accommodation”) or the result of governments that pursue unpopular policies being replaced at elections by governments more in line with the public (“electoral turnover”)? We explore these questions by estimating annual aggregate public preferences (“the policy mood”) using responses to 287 questions administered 2,087 times and annual policy using budgetary data (“nonmilitary government expenditure”) for the whole of the postwar period. We find that mood moves in the opposite direction to policy and variations in mood are associated with variations in annual vote intentions. Policy is responsive to party control but not directly responsive to mood. Shifts in mood eventually lead to a change in government and thus policy, but this process may be very slow if the public has doubts about the competence of the opposition.
Highlights
236 BARTLE, AV ELLANEDAANDMCGANN public’s preferences respond to policy “thermostatically”, moving right as policy moves left and left as it moves right (Wlezien 1995)
If we think that the appropriate form of representation is a delegate model – the government ought to follow the instructions of the people – and we apply this to the government as a whole as opposed to individual representatives, we should expect government policy to follow public opinion
If the policies demanded by the public want are impossible or ill-advised, trustee representation will result in policies that diverge from what the public wants
Summary
236 BARTLE , AV ELLANEDAANDMCGANN public’s preferences respond to policy “thermostatically”, moving right as policy moves left and left as it moves right (Wlezien 1995) These movements produce changes in vote intentions and, a turnover of power from one “side” to the other. It is still necessary to interpret what the people’s “instructions” are.3 Even in this case, we might expect the government to follow the will of the people in broad terms rather than in terms of specific policies. If we endorse a trustee model of representation – representatives are expected to use their judgement to advance the interests of the people to the best of their ability – a considerable amount of slippage between public opinion and policy may be completely acceptable in a democracy. If the policies demanded by the public want are impossible or ill-advised (they do not achieve the ends the public wishes to achieve), trustee representation will result in policies that diverge from what the public wants.
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