Abstract
ABSTRACT This article argues that the police accountability and governance reforms introduced by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government (2010–2015) have created a new window for ‘international-subnational’ crime and justice policy transfer to occur in England and Wales by placing Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) into a local strategic leadership position. It begins by providing an account of the emergence of PCCs and the controversies that have surrounded them, while at the same time maintaining that they are unlikely to be abolished in the foreseeable future. Three reasons as to why PCCs may seek to import policies from abroad are then presented, encompassing ballot-box politicking, hyper-awareness of constituency discontent and a demonstrated willingness to pioneer new crime control initiatives. Subsequent to presenting an international-subnational policy transfer case study - that of London’s Compulsory Sobriety Pilot - several analytical and practice-based ‘lessons’ are outlined pertaining to the process of emulating non-indigenous subnational crime control innovations.
Highlights
Take even a cursory glance at literature dedicated to discussing crime and its control and you are likely to stumble upon claims that policies have ‘travelled’ from an overseas jurisdiction and disembarked in the United Kingdom (UK)
Where studies of UK crime control policy emulation have been conducted, focus has tended towards the nation state, overlooking developments that are occurring at the subnational level
In taking steps to address this lacuna, this paper has argued that Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) may seek to utilise knowledge of subnational initiatives from a different country to cut crime and challenge the criminal justice status quo in their jurisdiction
Summary
BAINBRIDGE agents including politicians, bureaucrats, (non)governmental organisations, academics, policy entrepreneurs, pressure groups, knowledge institutions, policy intermediaries and international organisations The capacity of these agents to act both individually and collectively to secure policy change has been recognised, as has the ability of these agents to operate across different sites and scales ranging from the local to the inter/transnational. The second part draws on Evans’ (2010) conceptualisation of a policy transfer ‘opportunity structure’ to outline reasons as to why PCCs may seek to import subnational crime and justice innovations from abroad. These reasons encompass ballot-box politicking, hyper-awareness of constituency discontent and a demonstrated willingness to pioneer new crime control initiatives.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
