Abstract

The aim of this article is to discover in relation to which sanction it is possible to exercise the right of pardon (art. 139 of the Constitution). Basing on the systemic interpretation of the Constitution, the author argues that the power of pardon is the ‘reverse’ of the notion of repressive liability inferred from art. 42 of the Constitution. Consequently, in relation to all repressive sanctions within the meaning of art. 42 of the Constitution it is allowed to grant a pardon. Therefore it is possible to claim that a power of pardon can be applied to, inter alia, disciplinary penalties, lustration penalties, administrative monetary penalties, tax surcharges and penalties imposed on collective entities. Challenges for the doctrine of law – including possible collisions between exercising power of pardon and other constitutional provisions – are indicated.

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