Abstract

Haze control cost is hard to value by a crisp number because it is often affected by various factors such as regional uncertain meteorological conditions and topographical features. Furthermore, regions may be involved in different coalitions for haze control with different levels of effort. In this paper, we propose a PM2.5 cooperative control model with fuzzy cost and crisp coalitions or fuzzy coalitions based on the uncertain cross-border transmission factor. We focus on the Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei regions of China and obtain the following major findings. In the case of haze control in the Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei regions of China, local governments in the global crisp coalition can achieve their emission reduction targets with the lowest aggregated cost. However, Hebei fails to satisfy its individual rationality if there is no cost sharing. Therefore, the Hukuhara–Shapley value is used to allocate the aggregated cost among these regions so that the grand coalition is stable. However, the Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei regions cannot achieve their emission reduction targets in the global fuzzy coalition without government subsidies.

Highlights

  • IntroductionZhen et al [10] and Chen et al [11] proposed interval-parameter fuzzy programming mixed integer programming method and energy-environment optimization model based on fuzzy set theory, which provided solutions for more efficient pollution reduction

  • When forming a crisp coalition, the three regions of Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei join the coalition with 100% participation

  • In this paper, we established a model of PM2.5 cooperative control with fuzzy costs and crisp coalitions or fuzzy coalitions

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Summary

Introduction

Zhen et al [10] and Chen et al [11] proposed interval-parameter fuzzy programming mixed integer programming method and energy-environment optimization model based on fuzzy set theory, which provided solutions for more efficient pollution reduction. Some scholars combine fuzzy set theory with game theory to study public goods, such as water resources management. The fuzzy cooperative game model is applicable to haze control. Sun [20] established a cooperative game model with fuzzy participation and designed an economic benefit coordination mechanism for haze control. The existing studies on PM2.5 emission reduction strategies are based on regional total control principle This means as long as the total amount of regional pollution is up to an abatement request, it is assumed that all regions meet the standards.

Preliminary of Interval Numbers
Symbols
Fuzzy Cooperative Game Model with Crisp Coalition
Fuzzy Cooperative Game Model with Fuzzy Coalition
Overview of the Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei Regions Air Pollution
Results and Analysis
1–2–3 Global
Conclusions
Full Text
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