Plus ça change: Canada and Quebec in the Year Since the 1995 Referendum

Abstract

In my article on the 1995 Referendum, I concluded that most French-speaking Quebeckers--on the No side as well as the Yes--voted for fundamental change in Quebec's relation with the rest of Canada. Thus, resolution of the constitutional impasse could significantly lessen support for separatism in the foreseeable future. Conversely, if the constitutional issue remains unresolved, support for sovereignty could increase significantly. In January 1996, the agenda of the Quebec government of Lucien Bouchard appeared clear: By focusing on internal problems and leaving the ball of constitutional reform in the federalist court, the government would prepare for Quebec sovereignty while the remainder of Canada came to accept its inevitability due to its own inability to produce an acceptable constitutional package. The agenda of the federal government of Jean Chretien appeared primarily to involve the promotion of a limited special status for Quebec within the Canadian federation. My study demonstrated that both governments faced serious obstacles. Quebec's economic problems and social divisions (all of which were aggravated by the Referendum) would make the successful acquisition of sovereignty problematic even in the event of a decisive Yes majority in a future referendum. Outside Quebec, proposals for special status for Quebec are counter to the prevailing vision of Canada as a partnership between ten equal provinces containing numerous distinct cultural groups whose uniform rights are to be protected by the federal government. Much has changed, and much has stayed the same. In this study, I attempt to consider the implications of some of the principal developments of the past year. The Prospects for Separatism Premier Bouchard is correct in his assumption that, barring the sort of constitutional solution which he considers unlikely, the success of the Parti Quebecois as a separatist party will be determined in large measure by its success as a governing party within the federal system it hopes to destroy. Barring unforeseen developments, a second referendum will occur only in a second PQ mandate. (1) One can anticipate that support for separatism will fluctuate in the interim. For the moment, it is declining. (2) In part, the decline in separatist support is due to growing public anxiety over the current economic situation in Quebec, and especially the growing rate of unemployment. Recent polls consistently show jobs to be the most important concern of Quebeckers by a significantly higher margin than is the case for Canadians as a whole. (3) Economic concerns have led Montreal's Mayor Pierre Bourque and the leadership of the Action Democratique du Quebec party to urge a moratorium on referenda. (4) Premier Bouchard has acknowledged that Quebeckers were unprepared for the massive cuts in government spending which he is effecting. (5) His government's moves to eliminate the provincial deficit, which formed the centerpiece of the two 1996 socioeconomic summits of government, business, labor, and cultural groups, have incurred opposition from the public- and private-sector unions whose support was essential to past PQ governments. (6) More generally, public support for the government (as well as its separatist agenda) has declined in recent months. (7) Primarily as a result of economic worries, Quebeckers are more pessimistic about the future than Canadians as a whole. (8) Ordinarily, such feelings are not conducive to undertaking great projets de societe. Prime Minister Chretien regularly emphasizes the need for Quebec to focus on job creation, encouraging the perception that the economy is the problem. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that at the extreme, a feeling that things are so bad there is nothing to lose could result in an eventual increase in support for sovereignty. Of course, to the extent that the government's austerity program actually produces results, it could eventually benefit the separatist cause. …