Pluralism, Pragmatism and Self-knowledge

Abstract

In his recent book-length study of the current state of the philosophy of the social sciences, Patrick Baert takes aim at the usual methodological understanding of the field, an understanding that unites and limits many naturalist and nonnaturalist approaches alike. If the social sciences were instead inspired by pragmatism, they would aim at "self-knowledge," the end exhibited in the works of Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and, perhaps surprisingly, also in the work of pragmatists such as John Dewey. Such knowledge examines the deep cultural presuppositions of our practices, and in doing so "expands the scope of human possibilities" (pp. 8-9). Other philosophers who might appear to have affinities with pragmatism, such as critical theorists of various kinds, have not rid themselves of the pervasive influence of the spectator theory of knowledge and thus fail to consistently take the pragmatic turn. Social science, Baert tells us, ought to finally rid itself of the "ontological fallacy" and see that "there is nothing essential to the social that compels us to use a particular methodology" (p. 154). Instead, pragmatism teaches us to focus on the aims of research and in this way to take more seriously self-knowledge as an important and distinctive cognitive interest. In my remarks, I want to focus on these claims about the aims of a pragmatic social science. While Baert's overall aim of articulating a nonnaturalist conception of social science is deeply appealing, it is often at odds with his own commitment to methodological pluralism. While "self-referential knowledge" is one legitimate aim of a social science, it cannot be its sole or even preeminent aim. As the pragmatists themselves have cogently argued, there are many forms of practical success and many different kinds of practical knowledge. Practically oriented social science need not exclude causal and functional analyses to the extent that the social facts that they identify help us not just achieve our ends instrumentally, but also to identify, realize and transform our highest ideals. Thus, despite his own