Abstract
This paper advocates a variation on James Griffin's prudential value theory of well-being. Prudential value theory is consistent with various forms of pluralism. It also helps us understand how we do intra- and interpersonal comparisons of well-being. If we start from this view of well-being, I suggest we do not have a problem analogous to Arrow's impossibility result for a social welfare function: the analogous conditions are not appropiate constraints on a well-being function. The account of well-being is brought to bear on attempts made by some, particularly Dasgupta and Weale, to make international comparisons of well-being. It is argued that difficulties with such attempts occur chiefly because of disanalogies between interpersonal and international comparisons of well-being.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
