Pluralism and Social Unity

Abstract

In the nearly two decades since the publication of A Theory of Justice, John Rawls has not significantly altered the content of the principles the denizens of the original position are said to embrace. But many other aspects of his theory have changed. Four shifts strike me as being of particular importance. First, Rawls has placed an expanded notion of ''moral personality'' at the center of his argument and has revised several aspects of his theory (in particular, the accounts of primary goods and of individual rationality) accordingly. Second, he has fleshed out his views on the good and on the role that a conception of the good can play within the priority of the right. Third, he now characterizes the overall theory as political-that is, as drawn in part from basic political facts that constitute practical constraints and as detached from broader philosophical or metaphysical considerations. Finally, he has come to view his theory of justice not as developed sub specie aeternitatis but, rather, as drawn from (and addressed to) the public culture of democratic societies. Underlying these shifts, I believe, is a core concern that has become increasingly prominent in Rawls's thought. Modern liberal-democratic societies are characterized by an irreversible pluralism, that is, by conflicting and incommensurable conceptions of the human good (and, Rawls now stresses, of metaphysical and religious conceptions as well). The grounds of social unity are not hard to specify in homogeneous communities. But where are they to be found in societies whose members disagree so fundamentally? The answer, Rawls believes, lies in the lessons liberaldemocratic societies have slowly learned in the modern era. Alongside the fact of pluralism is a kind of rough agreement on certain basics: the treatment of all individuals as free and equal; the understanding of society as a system of uncoerced cooperation; the right of each individual to claim a fair share of the fruits of that cooperation; and the duty of all citizens to support and uphold institutions that embody a shared conception of fair principles. Once we devise a strategy for excluding from public discourse the matters on which we fundamentally disagree and for reflecting collectively on the beliefs we share, we can be led to workable agreements on the content of just principles and institutions. I believe that in focusing his recent thought on the problem of forging unity amid diversity, Rawls has posed exactly the right question.