Abstract
Two interrelated sets of problems arise in Aristotle's discussion of pleasure in the Nicomachean Ethics: those involving how pleasure can be an activity as opposed to a change and those involving how pleasures can differ in species. The former are well-known, but their thorough investigation reveals that Aristotle has failed to clarify how pleasures can have the features which he attributes to activities. The latter have been almost entirely overlooked by previous commentators, yet they are serious, as Aristotle's failure to explain the basis for distinguishing species of pleasure seems to undermine his defense of the value of pleasure.
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