Abstract
Can the International Criminal Court (ICC) use negotiated settlements to reduce atrocities? To fulfill its mandate of preventing grave crimes, the ICC has favored a strict enforcement approach while eschewing negotiations. Nonetheless, indictees (mis)perceive that they can have their indictments withdrawn, which unintentionally incentivizes indictees to limit violence. I evaluate this dynamic using the weighted regression method generalized synthetic control (GSC) to mitigate endogeneity and data unreliability, which are persistent challenges in analyses of ICC effectiveness. I apply the method to an armed group-level dataset along with a case study of the Lord's Resistance Army. The results indicate that ICC indictments lead to a substantial initial decline in attacks against civilians by armed groups affiliated with indictees, but the attacks return to pre-indictment levels when indictees face sustained punishments. The findings imply that the ICC negotiating settlements could incentivize indictees to refrain from atrocities.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
