Plea bargain dilemma, financial crime and asset recovery

Abstract

PurposeThis paper aims to debate moral and legal dilemma embedded with plea bargaining (PB) and raises a question whether the approach of “PB” is a viable tool to tackle financial crimes and to what extent it contributes in recovery of stolen money. This paper critically examines the concept with reference to relevant laws of the USA, the UK, Pakistan and Nigeria.Design/methodology/approachThis study used legal scholarship, jurisprudence and other open source data to analyze issues in the application of PB as a viable tool in asset recovery and financial crimes.FindingsThis paper provides that PB has certain moral and legal dilemma in terms of legality and punishment; the concept offers a sense of escape from criminal punishment by simply return of partial stolen money or “settlement” in exchange of discounted punishment even without imprisonment, thus incentivizing an offender. Further, the concept is unregulated, misapplied especially in developing world like Pakistan and Nigeria, where plea bargain laws are mostly manipulated by white-collar individuals. Therefore, this study recommends the amendment of relevant laws pertaining to PB; construction of “plea bargain handbook” to prevent arbitrariness and misapplication and to ensure transparency in its application; legislations like Speedy Trail Act; creation of “Fast Track-Model Courts” and a balancing system between “settlement” and “deterrence.”Originality/valuePerspectives on PB are brought to bear from financial crime and malpractice and recovery of stolen money.