Playing the Part: Impression Management during the Iran Hostage Crisis

Abstract

IR theories of diplomacy tend to focus on how diplomats make gains at the expense of their counterparts. However, modern diplomatic bargains sometimes hinge more on making them palatable to the domestic publics of the negotiating states. In this paper I draw on Erving Goffman’s concept of ‘impression management’ to explain how diplomats sometimes collude against their own publics in order to strike deals. I analyze the diplomacy of the Iranian Hostage Crisis of 1979-1980. During this crisis senior regime officials from the US and Iran colluded in the construction of a theatrical ‘scenario,’ in which both sides adopted roles and played their parts in the hope that this could satisfy the sentiments of both US and Iranian domestic publics. I argue that the scenario failed due to insufficient teamwork and an unsympathetic audience. In making this argument I challenge common assumptions about the adversarial nature of diplomacy, and the role of domestic audiences in diplomatic outcomes.