Playing the ‘Green Card’ ‐financing the provisional IRA: Part 1

Abstract

In the first of two articles on the fundraising activities of the Provisional IRA (PIRA), the extent and nature of the PIRA's finance operations are described. The areas of kidnapping for ransom, armed robbery, extortion and drug trading, although very specific, serve to illustrate the nature and potential complexity of fundraising activities, the general issues that surround them, as well as specific internal organizational issues and factors indicative of an acute awareness by PIRA leaders of the environments within which they and members of their organization operate. How the PIRA's involvement in certain kinds of criminal activities can and does influence not only their operational development and successes but also the development and sustenance of support for the PIRA's political wing, Sinn Fein, is discussed. It is clear that the absence of direct PIRA involvement in certain forms of criminality is imperative for the development of Sinn Fein's political successes. In the second article, which describes how and why PIRA financing operations have evolved into a much more sophisticated and technical set of activities (including money laundering), what emerges is a picture of the PIRA and Sinn Fein which serves to portray one of the most important long‐term, fundamental, limiting factors for the development of a large, sophisticated terrorist group (and its political wing) as finance, and not solely the personal or ideological commitment of its active members. Both of these articles will illustrate the PIRA leadership's many internal organizational concerns relating to fundraising, the links between the PIRA's militants and Sinn Fein ‐ and between PIRA and Sinn Fein fundraising ‐ and the relative sophistication of the Republican movement as a whole. Aiding these illustrations will be case study material, interview data and both public and privately‐held documentation. The descriptive data, surrounding issues and its implications presented here, along with case‐study material, discussions and interpretations presented in a second article serve to illustrate the many more general and conceptual issues emerging from terrorist financing.