Playing second fiddle in a dysfunctional orchestra: Australia, Britain and the Suez Canal 1950–56

Abstract

The failure of Australian Prime Minister Menzies' mission to Egypt in 1956 and the expulsion of the Australian diplomatic mission from Cairo dominate thinking about Australian Middle East diplomacy during the 1950s. Archival records, particularly in regard to the issue of the Suez Canal base negotiations concluding in 1954 show a predisposition, with occasional racist undertones, on the part of the Menzies government to line up with its British counterpart. Despite changing regional realities, and notwithstanding efforts by Australian officials in Cairo and Canberra to inject greater realism and caution into Australia's stance, Casey gave departmental officials little support. The article underlines the importance in Australian foreign policy of according appropriate weighting to fraternal and alliance-focussed concerns, but also to having the skills and experience required to evaluate the degree to which Australian interests may be affected by events on the ground and the policy choices of our partners.