Abstract
The chemical industry is very important for the world economy and this industrial sector represents a substantial income source for developing countries. However, existing regulations on controlling atmospheric pollutants, and the enforcement of these regulations, often are insufficient in such countries. As a result, the deterioration of surrounding ecosystems and a quality decrease of the atmospheric environment can be observed. Previous works in this domain fail to generate executable and pragmatic solutions for inspection agencies due to practical challenges. In addressing these challenges, we introduce a so-called Chemical Plant Environment Protection Game (CPEP) to generate reasonable schedules of high-accuracy air quality monitoring stations (i.e., daily management plans) for inspection agencies. First, so-called Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) in conjunction with source estimation methods are applied into this research. Second, high-accuracy air quality monitoring stations as well as gas sensor modules are modeled in the CPEP game. Third, simplified data analysis on the regularly discharging of chemical plants is utilized to construct the CPEP game. Finally, an illustrative case study is used to investigate the effectiveness of the CPEP game, and a realistic case study is conducted to illustrate how the models and algorithms being proposed in this paper, work in daily practice. Results show that playing a CPEP game can reduce operational costs of high-accuracy air quality monitoring stations. Moreover, evidence suggests that playing the game leads to more compliance from the chemical plants towards the inspection agencies. Therefore, the CPEP game is able to assist the environmental protection authorities in daily management work and reduce the potential risks of gaseous pollutants dispersion incidents.
Highlights
Controlling atmospheric pollution is essential for preserving today’s environment and there is a sense of urgency present due to the ever expanding chemical industrial activities
The MultiLPs algorithm was firstly proposed by Contizer and Sandhol [37], which is utilized to deal with Chemical Plant Environment Protection Game (CPEP) in the case that the game between the inspection agency and a certain type of chemical plant is computed
CPEPs constituted of players, strategies, payoffs and solution concept are firstly built up in this study through combining a game-theoretic model and source estimation methods
Summary
Controlling atmospheric pollution is essential for preserving today’s environment and there is a sense of urgency present due to the ever expanding chemical industrial activities. Zhang and Reniers [19] introduced a simultaneous game-theoretic model called “CPP Game” to protect chemical plants from terrorist attacks, and subsequently they [20] extended their model to sequential games played by a leading defender and several types of following attackers These initial successes pointed the way to major future applications in the CPP security domain, with major challenges in scaling up game-theoretic algorithms, to address bounded rationality of human adversaries and uncertainties in action execution and observation. Our Chemical Plant Environment Protection Games (CPEPs), which are truly different from the general concept of GSGs, follow the way of basic SSGs. In light of the above, we introduce a new game-theoretic model, which we called CPEP, since similar game-theoretic models have been successfully developed and applied in related domains.
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