Abstract
What motivates agents to choose pro-social but dominated actions in principal-agent interactions like the trust game? We investigate this by exploring the role higher-order beliefs about payoffs play in an incentivized laboratory experiment. We find that when there are asymmetries in such higher order information that generates “plausible deniability”, agents exploit that: otherwise trustworthy types are tempted into defecting.
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