Plausibility in the Greek Orators

Abstract

Todorov's tongue-in-cheek explanation refers to a concept which in Greek was called eixog. The word combines two aspects that modern logic differentiates: the objective meaning of probability (what is probable by the laws of nature) and the meaning of plausibility (what the addressee of a message considers plausible). Aristotle's use of the word shows that the Greek concept does not draw a sharp distinction between these two elements.1 Their intricate connection be? comes evident in, e.g., his Rhetoric (2.25 1402b 14-16) where he defines enthymemes. They are drawn from probability, he explains, when they are based upon things which occur regularly or are perceived to occur regularly (eoxi Se xa fxev ex xarv obg em xo no\v f ovxoov f Soxouvxoov ouvriY^ieva ev6u^ifpaxa ex xoav eixoxary). The same definition combines objective, purely statistical probability (xa obc; em xo noXv ovxa) and subjective plausibility (xa obg em xo no\v Soxouvxa). Ancient rhetorical theory in general highlighted the subjective as? pect, as is evident in the definition of eixog that Anaximenes (?) gives in his Rhetorica adAlexandrum (7.3.4 1428a27-35):