Platons letzte Prinzipien

Abstract

AbstractPlato’s claims concerning the last principles of philosophy differ in theRepublicand theSophist. At first sight, the claim of the idea of good and the claim of the system of the „most important concepts“ (megista genê) seem to be compatible if we insinuate a division of Platonic philosophy into a practical and a theoretical sphere. Yet, this hypothesis cannot be maintained, because theoretical and practical sphere interfere with one another. Through analysis of the significant parts of the dialogues it becomes clear that the theory of the „most important concepts“ is formed by practical thinking, i. e. by the assumption of a force (dynamis) inherent in basic concepts that effects conceptional determining and being determined. The idea of the good on the other hand is both the dynamic foundation of science as well as being the object of science itself. A resolution of the problem of the colliding claims is nevertheless possible based on an analysis of the dialectical inquiry of theSophistes. The two parts of this dialectical inquiry account for and give reasons: (1) for putting the ideas and basic concepts into an absolute position, and thereby also the idea of good; and (2) for putting the basic concepts into a system of self-legitimating relations of basic concepts determinating one another. The key of this account for both claims is a differentiation of the perspectives according to the differentiation of the two parts of the dialectical inquiry.