Plato and ‘Imitation.’

Abstract

InC.Q., January, 1928, pp. 16 sqq., I examined afresh the two discussions of poetry as imitation which are found in Plato's Republic. I pointed out that Plato used the term ‘imitation’ (μίμησɩς and cognates) in two senses, a good and a bad. The only kind of poetry which Plato excludes from his ideal state is that which is imitative in the bad sense of the term. He admits, and indeed welcomes, that kind of poetry which is imitative in the good sense (without discussing the question whether any such poetry is actually extant), and which he calls either imitative or non-imitative according as he is using the term ‘imitative’ in a good sense or a bad. The kind of poetry (briefly summed up in Rep. 607a as consisting of hymns to the gods and eulogies of good men) which is admitted into the ideal state is certainly imitative; and (which is the important point) it is in fact called imitative by Plato himself (e.g. in 397d τòν τοῦ ἐπɩεɩκοῦς μɩμŋτὴν ἄκρατον)—of course in the good sense of the word. Now the tenth book begins by stating that the result of the earlier discussion had been the decision to exclude ‘so much of poetry as is imitative.’ The implication is obviously that the remainder will not be excluded. (Plainly it is assumed that such a remainder either exists or will be successfully called into existence by the ideal state.) But what are we to call that remainder, unless it be non-imitative in the sense (the bad sense) in which the word is here used?