Platforms, Entry, and Innovation

Abstract

There is vigorous debate over the ability of the current antitrust enforcement regime in the United States to protect against potential reductions in competition caused by large technology companies. Some commentators have argued that current antitrust rules and processes cannot address adequately the competition issues presented by large technology companies and that a special set of rules or revisions to the antitrust laws are necessary to regulate their conduct. Others have argued that existing antitrust doctrine and processes are well-equipped to address any potential anticompetitive conduct by large technology companies, but have warned that such doctrine and processes are ill-suited to addressing non-economic questions such as the political power of specific companies. In this paper, we address the role of antitrust policy as it pertains to large platforms, focusing in particular on one important area of this debate: what restrictions, if any, should apply when a firm with a large market share in one market begins to operate in another market, either by de novo entry (e.g., product innovation) or through acquisition.