Platform Refund Insurance or Being Cast Out: Quantifying the Signaling Effect of Refund Options in the Online Service Marketplace

Abstract

This study examines whether and how an online service marketplace can leverage refund options endorsed by different parties (i.e., the platform or sellers) to address the “lemons” problem that is due to the intangibility, variability, and unreturnable nature of the services sought. We show that both platform refund insurance and a seller-guaranteed refund increase service demand, with platform refund insurance as the more effective option and hence having a more effective signaling mechanism, and that sellers with a better reputation or less popularity might benefit less from refund options. An investigation on further use of the more effective refund option, a “having platform refund insurance or being cast out” policy (i.e., retaining platform refund-insured sellers but expelling uninsured ones), reveals the effectiveness of this policy in filtering out low-quality sellers, shown as an improved quality of sellers on the platform due to new sellers’ replacing those who were expelled, yet a cost (i.e., a loss in demand and consumer welfare) for the platform due to the changes in characteristics (e.g., price) of sellers. This cost, however, is lower than the benefit from the improved quality of the sellers, so that the platform’s overall performance improves.