Abstract
Planning theory and social choice theory are merged to shed light on a liberal paradox. The theorem stating the impossibility of a Paretian liberal says that a cycle-free collective decision procedure cannot be guaranteed with liberalism and preference sovereignty. Liberalism grants each individual some right to decide within his or her personal sphere, and preference sovereignty means that the Pareto principle is respected. It may be impossible to design procedures for planning and decision making simultaneously realizing the values of rationality, individual liberty, and the public interest. In light of social choice theory, the article examines whether the well-known modes of planning prescribe practices serving to alleviate this conflict or causing it to arise lessfrequently. The author concludes that several modes (e.g., disjointed incrementalism, critical pragmatism) hold such properties and shows how communicative planning helps to circumvent Sen's liberal paradox.
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